COMMENT
THE CASE FOR EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL POWER TO
TAX MINERAL LESSEES OF INDIAN LANDS

I.

INTRODUCTION

That economic conditions on Indian reservations in
America are abominable is a well-known fact.' Indian tribal governments are in dire financial straits, without any adequate
source of revenue. In light of the prevalence of abject poverty,
unemployment, and lack of education among reservation Indians, the taxing of tribal members is not a feasible solution.
In a search for revenues, Indian attention has naturally focused on outside interests doing business on reservations
-especially mining, oil, and power companies that have longterm leases of Indian lands. 2 Theoretically, these leases are
negotiated by the Indians themselves, subject to the discretionary
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 3 In practice, however,
the terms of leases are negotiated by the Department of the
Interior and then submitted to the Indians for approval; the
tribal councils play a limited role, essentially retaining a veto
power over leases negotiated by the federal government. 4 It has
been asserted that the consideration passing to the Indians is
generally quite low. 5 Leases may even contain clauses by which
Indian tribes covenant not to tax their lessees; or royalties under
a lease may be stated to be in lieu of tribal taxation.6 Another
important economic element in the leasing context is state taxation of reservation lessees. 7 Indeed, such a state tax may place a
'See, e.g., W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LANDIWHITE MAN'S LAw 211 (1971) ("[T]he
Indian is the poorest, least healthy and least educated segment of Amrican society").
See generally Comment, Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59
CALIF. L. REv. 1261 n.3 (1971) (collecting sources).
2 For a general discussion of how these leases are made, see L. KELLY, THE NAVAJO
INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN PoLIcY 37-76 (1968); A. McLANE, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON
INDIAN LANDS (1955).
3 25 U.S.C. §§ 396-98 (1970).
4 R. Barsh & J. Henderson, Management of Natural Resurces: Oil and Gas 4, 8,
April 17, 1974 (unpublished paper at Harvard Law School).
51d. 4.
6 See text accompanying note 99 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 98-152 infra.
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far greater burden on the lessee than do the contractual royalty
payments provided in the lease agreement.8
The Indian tribes are sovereign, or at least quasi-sovereign
governmental bodies that perform essential governmental functions for their membersY Naturally, the tribes would like to tax
their lessees to increase the sadly depleted tribal revenues. It is
the contention of this Comment that the tribes have the power to
impose such a tax in the absence of the no-tax clauses in their
leases. Furthermore, it is suggested that even the no-tax clauses
may not be an insuperable bar, because repudiation of such
clauses, indeed repudiation of the entire leases, could be sustained as a legitimate action by a sovereign tribe which cannot be
held to have irrevocably contracted away an essential attribute of
its sovereignty, the power to tax.
The reassertion of the right of a tribe to tax its lessees would
be a nearly hollow victory, however, if the states were permitted
to continue their present taxation of the Indians' lessees. This
Comment will seek to show: (1) that state taxation of reservation
lessees is impermissible if it interferes with Indian tribal
revenue-raising ability or with a tribe's capacity to govern itself
(often the two are interrelated); and (2) that federal statutes
which have been interpreted to permit such taxation have been
misconstrued.
Furthermore, this Comment will seek to demonstrate that
an Indian tribe should have under current law an action for
damages against the United States based on breach of fiduciary duty to the tribe in cases where the Government has
negotiated leases yielding insufficient consideration or containing unconscionable restrictions on Indian power. This duty follows from the relationship the Government itself has forced
upon the Indian tribes, which has been characterized as the relationship between a guardian and his ward.
Throughout this Comment some generalizations are made
about tribal, state, and federal powers. It should be recognized
at the outset that the conclusions of the present analysis may be
subject to some variation, depending on the treaties and federal
' See

text accompanying note 118 infra.
' See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-49 (1942). [hereinafter cited
as COHEN]. Cohen's influential and comprehensive study has been revised as U.S.
SOLICITOR

FOR

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

THE

INTERIOR,

FEDERAL

INDIAN

LAW

(1958)

[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. Many changes in Cohen's statements have
been made in the newer work. See, e.g., note 37 infra & accompanying text. See also J.
WHITE, TAXING THOSE THEY FOUND HERE 18 n.63, 19-20 n.65 (1972): "The subtle
changes in language made in Cohen's work during that revision cause one to wonder
What a 1984 revision would look like."
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statutes applicable to particular tribes, and on the federal statutes defining the relationships of particular states to Indian
tribes within their borders.' 0
II.

GENERAL CONTOURS OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY

A.

The Nature of the Indian "Nation"

Indian tribes have many of the attributes of sovereign nations. As will be described below, these include the power to tax
and to regulate activities on the reservations, the power to operate court systems, the right to make treaties or their equivalent,
and sovereign immunity.'" To analogize a tribe to any other
familiar governmental entity-foreign nation-state, 1 2 state of the
Union,' 3 municipality14 -- is inherently unsound. Nor is it accu-

rate to compare the Indian tribes to private organizations such as
corporations. 1 5 The nature of tribal sovereignty has, through
the operation of treaties, statutes, and common law, become
unique.
The first major opportunity for the Supreme Court to consider the nature of Indian tribal sovereignty came in the early
1830's. Georgia had been, to say the least, hostile to the
Cherokee Indians within its borders. In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,1 6 the tribe sought to enjoin Georgia officials from enforcing the state's laws inside the Cherokee reservation. Although recognizing the tribe as an entity capable of making a
treaty with the United States,' 7 the Court concluded that the
tribe could not maintain an action in a federal court because it
8
was neither one of the United States nor a "foreign nation.'
The Court characterized the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations," relying both on historical analysis and on article I,
section 8, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to regu'0See

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
11See COHEN, supra note 9, at 122-49, 283-84.
"2Cf. Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th
Cir. 1959) (Indian tribes are not states, but occupy a "status higher than that of states.").
1. Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11-12 (1831); text accompanying notes 17-18 infra.
14 Cf. W. WASHBURN, supra note 1, at 79: "The Indian Reorganization Act extended
to the Indian community powers of self-government roughly equivalent to those possessed by incorporated towns in the United States."
" See note 93 infra.
16 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
17Id.at 16.
"IId. at 18-20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to
... Controversies between two or more States; ... and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."
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late commerce with the "Indian tribes,"
as distinct from "foreign
19
nations" and the "several states."
20
A year later, in the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court reached the merits of the controversy between Georgia
and the Cherokees in a full-blown treatment of Indian sovereignty. This case involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
requiring white persons desiring to reside on the Indian reservation to obtain permission from the Governor of Georgia and to
take an oath of allegiance to that state. Samuel Worcester, a
white missionary from Vermont, had entered the Cherokee reservation to preach Christianity, with permission of the tribe and
under the authority of the President of the United States, but
without authorization by Georgia as prescribed by statute. He
was convicted of violating the state law and was sentenced to
four years at hard labor. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction on the ground that the Georgia legislation violated federal treaties and laws and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 2 1 The defect of the Georgia statute was that it asserted
over the Cherokee nation a jurisdiction that the state of Georgia
did not possess.2 2
In an exhaustive opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall analyzed the legal status of the Indian tribes. He considered
the effect of the discovery of parts of America by European
nations on the rights of native Indians. The discovering nation,
said Marshall, had a good claim against other nations, but this
claim is only "an exclusive right to purchase" 23 the land that the
Indians should desire to sell. Discovery "could not affect the
rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the
'
memory of man. "24

1930 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
2031 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
21
1d. at 560-61.
22 See id. at 542.

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the
assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress.
Id. at 561.

23Id.at 544.
24 Id. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall: "The extravagant and absurd idea that the

feeble settlements made on the sea-coast, or the companies under whom they were made,
acquired legitimate power by the colonial charters to govern the people, or occupy the
lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man." Id. at 544-45. Of course,
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Treaties made with the Indians by the English, and later by
the United States, generally stipulated that the Indians were
"under the protection" of the other party.2 5 Such treaties, said
Marshall, merely bound the Indians to the Crown (and later to
the United States) "as a dependent ally, claiming the protection
of a powerful friend and neighbor, and receiving the advantages
of that protection, without involving a surrender of their national character. '2 6 The treaty grant to Congress of the "sole
and exclusive right of... managing all [the Indians'] affairs" did
not constitute any surrender of self-government by the Indians.2 7 This was merely a grant of power to regulate the Indian
28
trade and trade-related matters.
The Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Lee29 is the
modern-day endorsement of Chief Justice Marshall's approach.
The Court there did not assume that all power rests in the state
and federal government, but rather undertook to determine
which powers had been retained by the Indian tribes from their
aboriginal sovereignty or had been restored to the tribes by federal statute. Justice Black echoed the style and language of Chief
Justice Marshall:
Originally the Indian tribes were separate nations
within what is now the United States. Through conquest
and treaties they were induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange for
Marshall is hyperbolizing. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 22
(1831) (Johnson,j., concurring).
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1792 that the American right in Indian land was merely
"the sole and exclusive right of purchasing from them whenever they should be willing to
sell," "a right of pre-emption." And in 1793 he noted, "I considered our right of preemption of the Indian lands not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or
paramountship whatever .... that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent
sovereignty so long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever. W.
WASHBURN, supra note 1, at 56 (footnote omitted).
2- 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551.

26 Id.at 552. Marshall further observed that "[p]rotection does not imply the destruction of the protected." Id.
21Id. at 553-54; see 3 E. VATTEL, THE LAW of NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW bk. I, ch. I, §§ 5-6 (Carnegie Institute ed., C. Fenwick transl. 1916).
Originally published in 1758, Vattel's work was a textbook in the American universities in

1780, and his work is still dominant today. See W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
76 (1964).
Vattel was relied on by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832), in support of the Indians' sovereignty, and similarly by Justice
Thompson, dissenting from the denial of jurisdiction in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 52-53 (1831) (dissenting opinion).

28131 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553-54.
29 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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federal protection, aid, and grants of land. When the
lands granted lay within States these governments
sometimes sought to impose their laws and courts on
the Indians .... The constitutionality of these laws was
tested in Worcester v. Georgia....
Rendering one of his
most courageous and eloquent opinions, Chief Justice
Marshall held that Georgia's assertion of power was invalid....
Despite bitter criticism . . . the broad principles of
that decision came to be accepted as law ....
Over the
years this Court has modified these principles in cases
where essential tribal relations were not involved and
where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized,
30
but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.
The reassertion of this approach in subsequent Supreme Court
cases dealing with Indian sovereignty, 3 1 indicates that today
much "remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a sepa3' 2
rate people to whom state jurisdiction . . . may not extend.
B.

Indian Sovereignty and the United States Constitution

It is not only state legislation that is inapplicable in general
to Indian nations; Indian tribes have also been held to be unrestrained by the Constitution. 33 The Supreme Court has apparently faced the issue squarely only once, in Talton v. Mayes. 3 4 In
that case a defendant convicted in the Cherokee courts attacked
his conviction on the ground that his grand jury, which consisted
of only five members, was insufficient under fifth amendment
standards. The Supreme Court held the fifth amendment inap35
plicable, as it was a limitation on the federal government only.
The Court rejected the notion that the relationship between the
Indians and the federal government makes tribal powers in effect federal powers. Tribal powers were found not to be created
by the Constitution, although they were "subject to its general
provisions and the paramount authority of Congress. ' 36 Thus
30

Id. at 2 18-19 (footnotes omitted).

31See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 179 (1973); Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1962).
32 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 (1973).
33 See generally W. WASHBURN, supra note 1, at 173-93 (1971).

34 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
5 Id. at 384.
36 Id. at 382-84. But see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding
that under the particular circumstances of that case, where the Indian courts had been
3
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the thirteenth amendment, absolutely abolishing slavery everywhere in the United States, does apply to Indians. But as Cohen
puts it: "Where ...the United States Constitution levies particular restraints upon federal courts or upon Congress, these restraints do not apply to the courts or legislatures of the Indian
tribes. Likewise, particular restraints upon the states are inap'3 7
plicable to Indian tribes.
The issue whether constitutional limitations on states apply
to Indian tribes has never been passed on explicitly by the Supreme Court, but lower court decisions following Talton suggest
that they do not. In Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez38 six Protestant
Pueblo Indians brought suit against their Pueblo community
under the Civil Rights Act, 39 alleging that its governing body
and governor had subjected them to indignities, threats, and reprisals because they were not Catholic. The district court held
that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because no action in violation of the federal statute was alleged. Specifically, because the
tribe did not derive its governmental powers from the state of
New Mexico, defendants had not acted under "color of state
40
law."
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council4 1 presented
even more clearly the question of the Constitution's application
to tribal governments. In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin
enforcement of a tribal law forbidding the possession or use of
peyote on the Navajo reservation. Plaintiffs alleged the tribal law
violated their right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments. The Tenth Circuit held that
the federal courts had no jurisdiction, for neither amendment
binds the tribal government. The first amendment limits congressional action; and the fourteenth, state action. Because the
laws of Indian tribes are neither state nor federal, the court
reasoned, neither limitation can apply. The Court pointed out
established by the federal government and were still subject to its control, those courts
functioned inpart as federal agencies, thus giving a federal court jurisdiction to issue a
writ of habeas corpus on petition of an Indian convicted and sentenced by a tribal court).
" COHEN, supra note 9, at 124 (footnotes omitted). See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,

supra note 9, at 400 (describing an Indian reservation as "in some respects, a civil-rights
no man's land where there is no relief against tribal oppression because of the failure of
Congress to make Federal civil-rights provisions . . . applicable." (footnote omitted)).
Congress has acted since this statement was made, however, to change this situation to
some extent. See text accompanying notes 43-46 infra.
11 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
3942 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
41 119 F. Supp. at 432.
41

272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
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that the Constitution is binding upon Indian nations only where
that document expressly binds them or where it is made binding
by treaty or by act of Congress.4 2
In the 1960's, as interest in civil rights increased, Congress
became concerned with the lack of constitutional restraints on
tribal governments. The result was the passage of the Constitutional Rights of Indians Act (the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968). 4 3 The Act binds all Indian tribal governments by many,
but not all, of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and other
sections of the Constitution. 44 A highly significant aspect of the
Act is simply that Congress felt it necessary; its passage acknowl42Id. at 134-35. The court relied on Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), and
Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954). See also Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967) (fifth
and fourteenth amendments not applicable to tribe).
43Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77, §§ 201-03, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-03 (1970). See W. WASHBURN, supra note 1, at 186-87.
14 25 U.S.C. § 1302 provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of
grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures,
nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own
expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one
offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a
term of six months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six
persons.
For detailed discussion of the Act, see Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An
Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D.L. REV. 337 (1969); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
ConstitutionalStatus of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343 (1969).
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edged that Indians are not bound by constitutional limitations in
the absence of legislation.
In Groundhog v. Keeler,45 a case arising after the passage of
the Act, the court held that Congress had not made the fourteenth amendment applicable to Indian tribal governments. The
court's survey of the Act's legislative history led it to conclude
that Congress had not bound Indians to all constitutional
limitations. 46 This case is consistent with the theory that all powers not taken away by the federal government are retained by
the Indians.
C. CongressionalActions Affecting the Extent of Indian Sovereignty
Although Indian tribes are not covered by the federal constitution and although they are by their sovereign nature
theoretically free from interference by the states, the federal
government retains the power to expand or contract the scope of
their sovereign authority.47 Some congressional legislation has
restricted tribal powers, but other acts, and even the general
presumption underlying some restrictive acts, have reaffirmed a
theory of broad tribal power.
1. The Treaty Power
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia4 8 and Worcester v. Georgia,49
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Indian tribes are nations,
albeit "domestic dependent" ones, which are capable of making
treaties with the United States. In 1871, however, a statute was
passed declaring that "no Indian nation or tribe . . . shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or
50
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.
On its face, this statute would seem to be a congressional repudiation of the basis for the Worcester decision, but a closer analysis
reveals otherwise. Both the purpose and the practical effect of
this departure from a strict treaty policy in dealing with Indians
were to assuage the House of Representatives, who were dissatisfied with the Senate's exclusive control over Indian affairs pursuant to the treaty powers of article II, section 2 of the
43442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
46Id. at 681-82.
47See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183 (1930); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886); United States v. Rodgers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
4830 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
4931 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
50 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). Treaties
already in operation were still to be honored, however. Id.
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Constitution. 5 1 Following the 1871 Act, Indian "treaties" were

made legislatively, requiring the approval of both houses of Congress. That Indian policy continued to be conducted by "agreements" between tribes and Congress as a whole, 52 suggests Congress had not really altered the extent of federal power over
5
Indian tribes.

3

2. Early Criminal Jurisdiction
The Court in United States v. Rodgers54 made clear that Congress has the power to make punishable criminal offenses committed on an Indian reservation. The precise issue in Rodgers was
whether Congress had exercised this power. The Court correctly
concluded that Congress had acted to assert federal jurisdiction
over crimes committed on specific reservations, excluding crimes
committed by Indians against Indians. 55
In Rodgers, the reservation was located in "Indian Country,"
a term identifying territory located outside the boundaries of
any state and wholly under federal and tribal control. Where
Indian land was within a state's boundaries, a different result
was dictated by congressional legislation in some cases. 56 In
United States v. McBratney57 the Supreme Court held that a federal court has no jurisdiction over crimes committed by whites
against whites on a reservation within a state's boundaries. This
did not mean that the Indian tribes had jurisdiction, but rather
that the offense was cognizable only in state courts. 58 Where the
alleged crime was committed by a non-Indian against an Indian,
however, the states were preempted by federal jurisdiction beSi The power to make treaties is in the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
-2 Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian ReorganizationAct of 1934, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 955, 958 (1972).
53 Id.

45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846).
"I Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, repealing Act of Mar. 3, 1817, 3 Stat.
383. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 322.
11 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 139, 18 Stat. 474 (providing "[t]hat the inhabitants of
the Territory of Colorado ... are.., authorized to form ... a State government ....
which State shall be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatsoever.") The Supreme Court held that this provision gave
Colorado, as a natural attribute of state sovereignty, power to control the actions of its
citizens on Indian lands located within the state. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.
621 (1881). Any inconsistent treaty provisions were necessarily repealed. Federal jurisdiction remained only "so far as may be necessary to carry out such provisions of the treaty
• . . as remain in force," i.e., those provisions essential to federal Indian policy. Id.
at 624.
-7 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
"' See also New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United
States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
11
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cause of the United States' interest in protecting its Indian
wards.
In all the above areas, Congress had explicitly taken away
the power of the Indians to control criminal justice on the reservation. In areas in which Congress did not act, however, the
Indians retained their full powers. From the first statute establishing federal jurisdiction over Indian offenses 59 to the present
time, 0 crimes committed by Indians against Indians have been
left to tribal jurisdiction. This residuum of Indian sovereignty
61
was graphically demonstrated in Ex parte Crow Dog.
In Crow Dog, a Brul Sioux Indian was convicted in a federal
court of the murder of another member of his tribe on their
Dakota Territory reservation. The statute reserving to the Indians jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against
Indians6 2 was invoked by the Court to preclude the jurisdiction
of the federal court. Congress, however, was unwilling to rest
with this result and passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885,63
making some offenses cognizable by federal courts although
committed by Indians against Indians on a reservation. This
legislation was soon tested and its constitutionality upheld by the
Court 4 on the determination that Congress' power rested fundamentally on the sovereignty of the United States over its territory by right of ownership.6 5
The conclusion to be drawn is that in the criminal jurisdiction area, at least, the states may intrude into reservation affairs
only when authorized by Congress. Congress has seen fit to allow
the states criminal jurisdiction only in situations in which no
Indian is directly involved; in such circumstances it is probable
that no strong federal or Indian interest is at stake. Although the
federal government has the power to intrude as much as it likes,
it must do so explicitly by statute. Congress has exercised this
power in only a few instances, leaving the tribal governments to
protect their members in most cases of crimes committed by
5' Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383.
60 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970); see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 319-20.
61 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
62 Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80. § 1, 18 Stat. 318 (repealed 1948) (now 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (1970)).
"' Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
3242 (1970). The crimes specified were murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent
to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. Several crimes have since been added to the orginal
list. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 320;
Comment, supra note 52, at 957.
64 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
65
Id. at 380.
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Indians against Indians. The area of criminal jurisdiction is a
specific application of the rule articulated in Worcester v.
Georgia:66 Indians have sovereign powers of self-government unless and until they are taken away by Congress.
3.

The Indian Reorganization Act
Perhaps the most important piece of Indian legislation ever
enacted by Congress, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (the
Wheeler-Howard Act), 67 recognized and legitimized existing
tribal governments and encouraged Indian tribes to adopt constitutions and corporate charters. In the 258 tribal elections held
under the Act, 181 tribes (129,750 Indians) voted for inclusion
68
while 77 tribes (86,365 Indians) refused its coverage.
Although many people may have thought that the Indian
Reorganization Act granted sovereign powers to Indian tribes,
most of the powers existed prior to the Act and were only reaffirmed by it.6 9 Felix Cohen points out that in seeking this legislation the Roosevelt administration merely "accepted the logical
' 70
implications of Indian self-government.
4. Termination
In the 1950's the United States embarked on a policy called
"termination," which aimed at assimilating the Indians into the
mainstream of American society and at severing them from
United States guardianship as soon as possible. 71 Pursuant to this
policy the states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin were given criminal and civil jurisdiction over much
66 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see text accompanying notes 12-28 supra.
67 Act ofJune 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
66 Comment, supra note 52, at 972 (citing T. HASS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT UNDER THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 3 (U.S. Ind. Serv. Tribal Rels.
Pamph. 1947)). The Navajo tribe, the country's largest, rejected the Act's provisions in a
referendum held pursuant to the Act. Comment, supra note 52, at 972. The tribal
sovereignty of the Navajos has nevertheless been consistently recognized by the Supreme
Court. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
69 See Comment, supra note 52, at 970-72. This is not to deny that the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970), was important. Section 461 of the Act prevented Indian land from being "allotted in severalty to any Indian," thus reinforcing
central tribal control over reservations, and section 463 restored other lands to tribal
ownership. In addition, despite the theoretical status of the Indians, "[p]rior to the
passage of the Act the Indian Service administered the reservations in complete disregard of tribal authority." W. WASHBURN, supra note 1, at 79.
70 COHEN, supra note 9, at 123.
7 For a brief and very critical examination of this policy, see W. WASHBURN, supra

note 1, at 80-97.

1975]

TRIBAL POWER TO TAX LESSEES

of the Indian territory within their respective borders; this jurisdiction extended to crimes committed by and against Indians
72
and to civil causes of action to which Indians were parties.
Other states were given authority to acquire such jurisdiction
upon their own affirmative action, 73 but none has done so. In
1968, the statute was amended to require Indian consent
to
74
sovereignty.
tribal
inherent
their
of
elimination
further
Although these statutory measures demonstrate the plenary
power of Congress over the Indian tribes, they all necessarily
recognize sub silentio that the Indians would retain the sovereign
powers involved absent explicit and affirmative action by
Congress.7 5
III.

TRIBAL POWER TO TAX

That Indian tribes have complete power to tax both Indians
and non-Indians living or doing business on Indian lands cannot
be seriously questioned. This power stems from the tribes' status
as sovereign entities recognized by courts since the country was
born. Concurring in Worcester v. Georgia, Justice McLean noted
that "[t]he power to tax is also an attribute of sovereignty.

'7 6

He

might have added that the taxing power is an essential sovereign
attribute. No government stripped of the right to support itself
can long retain any real sovereignty. Vattel, writing about situations in which a sovereign state has submitted itself to another
more powerful state, explains that there is no single certain form
72

Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162;

28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1360 (1970).
73
1d.
74 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1970).
75 In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956), a case upholding
the Indians' sovereign power to tax, the court relied on Felix Cohen's famous formulation of three principles of Indian sovereignty:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of
the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations,
but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its power of
local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties
and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified,full
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly
constituted organs of government.
COHEN, supra note 9, at 123 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied), quoted in 231 F.2d at
92-93. Although Cohen's point two is not strictly accurate, the thrust of the complete
formulation, liberal for its time, continues to be instructive. The conclusion of point three
seems to have firmer judicial support and thus may be considered more "accurate" today
than when it was written. Indeed, its essence forms the basis for much of the remainder
of this Comment.
76 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 591 (1832) (concurring opinion).
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of submission. Rather, according to the agreement of the contracting parties, the stronger "may either leave to the weaker
state a part of its sovereignty, and merely restrict it in certain
respects, or it may destroy it altogether. .... -77
The Supreme Court, beginning at least as long ago as Morris
v. Hitchcock,7 8 has held that the power to tax is one of the attributes of sovereignty retained by the Indians, and this result has
never been successfully challenged. The Eighth Circuit has developed the clearest line of cases in this area, and the underlying
principles have only very recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 79 In Buster v. Wright 80 the Eighth Circuit upheld
an Indian business license tax against a claim that the tax was
invalid because Congress, in authorizing the entry of nonIndians into Indian territory for the purpose of doing business,
had not explicitly permitted the tribes to impose license fees
upon them. The court stated:
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the
terms upon which noncitizens may transact business
within its borders did not have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United States. It was
one of the inherent and essential attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people,
indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute of its government
until by the agreement of the nation itself or by the
superior power of the republic it is taken from it ...
[E]very original attribute of the government of the
Creek Nation still exists intact which has not been destroyed or limited by act of Congress or by the contracts
of the Creek tribe itself."'
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe8 2 reiterated and reinforced
the holding of Buster v. Wright. In upholding a tax on a lessee of
Indian land because taxing power had never been removed by
83
Congress, the court noted that the Indian Reorganization Act
served to add a separate rationale for finding plenary Indian tax
power on the reservation:
77E. VATrEL, supra note 27, bk. I, ch. 16, § 194.
78 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
7' McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

80135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
81

Id. at 950.
82 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
83 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970); see text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
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Inasmuch as it has never been taken from it, the defendant Oglala Sioux Tribe possesses the power of taxation
which is an inherent incident of its sovereignty.
We conclude from the original precept of tribal
sovereignty and the fact that the power of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe to impose the tax or license in question has
not been pretermitted by any federal statute.

.

., but, to

the contrary, has been implemented by the Indian
Reorganization Act
[25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970)], that such
84
power still exists.
Finally, in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe85 the court faced a
constitutional challenge by non-Indian lessees to a tax levied by
the Tribal Council upon leases. The lessees claimed that the tax
violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments and that it constituted taxation without representation. The court held that the
Indian tribes were not states and that the fourteenth amendment
therefore had no application. 8 6 It also rejected the fifth
Amendment claim, citing Cohen for the proposition that the
"'Indian tribes... are not creatures of either the federal or state
governments,'" and that, therefore, " '[i]t would seem that the
tribal taxing power is not subject to limitations imposed upon
state or federal legislation by the Federal Constitution.' ",87 As to
the claim of taxation without representation, the court observed
that a government's ability to tax property located in its jurisdiction does not depend upon the owner's residing within its borders; in that sense a tax may be levied against persons who were
88
not represented when the decision to tax was made.
84231 F.2d at 99. The Act was said to have given rise to the adoption by Indians of a
constitution providing for the levy of taxes.
The court quoted from COHEN, supra note 9, at 142, which states: "One of the
powers essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to levy taxes. That
this power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn
... by treaty or by act of Congress is a proposition which has never been successfully

disputed." 231 F.2d at 98.
85259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
16Cf. text accompanying notes 193-212 infra, dealing with the application of the
contract clause to Indian tribes.
s1259 F.2d at 557; COHEN, supra note 9, at 181, 267.
Of course since the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 this result is no
longer true. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970); cf. United States v. Mazurie, 95 S.Ct. 710, 718
n.12 (1975).
86 259 F.2d at 557. The court relied on Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 277 (1898):
Thus it has been held that personal allegiance has no necessary connection
with the right of taxation; an alien may be taxed as well as a citizen. . . .So,
likewise, it is settled law that the property, both real and personal, of non-
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the Eighth
Circuit's position. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 89 a unanimous Court noted that although the issue whether
Indian powers of -self-government derive from residual
sovereignty or from federal statutes may be debatable9" (especially in light of the Indian Reorganization Act), 9 1 the fact is that
Indians retain "the power of regulating their internal and social
relations," no matter what the source. 92 And in United States v.
Mazuie,93 though it was again unnecessary to decide whether the
source of the power was the tribes' independent authority or
congressional enactment, the Court unanimously held that the
Wind River Tribes of Wyoming possessed sufficient authority to
regulate the sale of liquor in Indian country, including the authority to grant and deny licenses. In that case the Indians had
refused to issue a tribal liquor license to a Mr. and Mrs. Mazurie,
forcing them to close their tavern. Ruling in favor of the Indians, the Court rejected a claim similar to the taxation without
representation claim presented in Barta, and determined that it
was irrelevant to the issue of the tribe's taxing power that the
Mazuries could not become members of or participate in the
tribal government. 94 The presence of the Mazuries and their
residents may be lawfully subjected to the tax laws of the state in which they are
situated.
890 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
9 Id. at 172 n.8.
9125 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
92411 U.S. at 173 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1896)).
93 95 S. Ct. 710 (1975). rev'g 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973). The holding the court of
appeals was one of the most anti-tribal decisions ever handed down. The court of appeals
made the following statement, which was completely rejected by the Supreme Court:
The Tribes have the usual powers of an owner of land, to the extent of such
ownership, over those using their land. This power is often confused with some
elements of sovereignty when large tracts are involved ....
The Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes are very important organizations
which exercise a broad tribal authority over their members. They also exercise
authority as would owners of large tracts of land....
The tribal members are citizens of the United States. It is difficult to see
how such an association of citizens could exercise any degree of governmental
authority or sovereignty over other citizens who do not belong, and who cannot
participate in any way in the tribunal [sic] organization. The situation is in no way
comparable to a city, county, or special district under state laws. There cannot be
such a separate "nation" of United States citizens within the boundaries of the
United States which has any authority, other than as landowners, over individuals who are excluded as members.
487 F.2d at 19. The court then distinguished Iron Crow on the mistaken premise that it
only involved tribal authority over members of the tribe. The court also failed to mention
Barta, which reaffirmed Iron Crow, expressly applying it to non-Indian lessees of Indian
lands.
91 95 S. Ct. at 718.
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transaction of business on the reservation were viewed to be
decisive. 95
Indian taxation of the lessees of tribal land would be enforceable, in the first instance, in tribal courts, 96 and the tribe
would in most cases have substantial property of the lessee
within its jurisdiction to levy against should the lessee fail to pay
the tax or the judgment. Should it become necessary to go outside the Indian jurisdiction in order to enforce a tax lien, the
97
federal courts are authorized to hear the claim.
IV.

STATE POWER TO TAX LESSEES OF INDIAN LAND

The Indians' power to tax can mean little if the states in
which reservations are located are also permitted to impose taxes
on the same activities.98 At least one Indian land lease makes
clear that the reason the lessee required a no-tax clause9 9 is that
it could not bear the burden of a double tax at the regional level.
The economic problem of double taxation remains, however,
whether or not the lease contains a no-tax clause. For the same
practical reasons that state taxes diminish inexorably the rents
which the Indians are able to charge, 10 0 state taxes also seriously
hinder the ability of Indians to tax their lessees.
The remainder of this section will examine the power of
states to tax reservation lessees. The conclusion reached here is
that state taxation of mineral lessees of Indian land are generally
invalid for two reasons. First, state taxes that substantially reduce
95Id. (quoting William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
96See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
97The claim could be brought by the United States on behalf of the Indians under
28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970) (general federal jurisdiction over claims brought by the United
States). Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958). Or it could be
brought by the Indian tribe itself under its general right to bring suits in federal courts.
Id.; Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 640 (1943).
91The Supreme Court has definitively held that a state has no power to tax reservation Indians on income earned on the reservation. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). Thus, tribal Indians on reservations are safe from double
taxation, and a portion of their income could be assessed to help run the tribal government. This tax would not be a fruitful source of tribal income, however, because of the
poverty of most Indians. A more realistic goal for the tribes is to seek to raise revenues by
taxing those outsiders who are using and profiting from Indian lands.
9 In § 7(f)(i) of a Navajo Power Plant Lease (on file at Biddle Law Library), the lessee
gives up his putative right to be free from tribal taxation if the State of Arizona either
voluntarily stops taxing the lessee or if it is determined to be without power to so tax. In §
7 (f)(iii), "[t]he parties agree that the basic purpose and intent of this Section 7 (f) is that
the Lessees ... shall not be subject to double taxation ...."

1") Given that a lessee is willing to pay a certain total amount for a leasehold, state
taxes on the income from that leasehold will serve to reduce the portion of the total
received by the Indians. See Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
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the rental revenues of a tribe, and thus impair its ability to function, are illegal infringements on the Indians' right of selfgovernment. Second, state taxes that in any way interfere with a
tribe's ability to tax or regulate its lessees are an illegal interference with the Indians' exercise of their sovereign rights to tax
and to regulate.
Although the above assertions obviously overlap, they have
been the subject of separate lines of cases and therefore will be
discussed separately.
A.

Lessee Immunity from State Taxation

1. Lessee Immunity from State Taxation Due to the
Governmental Immunity of the Indian Tribe
At one time lessees of Indian lands were considered immune from state taxation under the "federal instrumentality"
doctrine. The theory was that "[a] state tax on the lessee, the
lease, or the profits from the lease would be 'a direct hamper
upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that
it can for its wards.' "101 This immunity was based primarily on
the federal government's immunity from state taxation rather
than on an independent tribal immunity.' 0 2 The federal instrumentality doctrine is no longer accepted by the Supreme Court
as a per se rule rendering all who deal with the federal government immune from state taxation on the income from such
0 3
dealings.1
In rejecting certain oil companies' claims to immunity from
state taxation of income derived from activities on reservation
leaseholds (claims based almost solely on the federal instrumentality doctrine), the Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas
Co. 104 observed:
True intergovernmental immunity [from taxation] remains for the most part. But, so far as concerns private
persons claiming immunity for their ordinary business
operations (even though in connection with governmental activities), no implied constitutional immunity can
rest on the merely hypothetical interferences with gov101Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1949) (citing Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922)).
102 See id. at 355. Indians have been held immune from state taxation of their reservation income. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
103 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
104 336 U.S. 342 (1949).

TRIBAL POWER TO TAX LESSEES

1975]

ernmental
functions here asserted to sustain exemp05
tions.1
The Court held the mere fact that a state tax might affect the
royalty the federal government could obtain for the Indian tribe
to be insufficient interference with the federal government to
justify lessee immunity from tax.
The Court made clear, however, that the governmental immunity of the Indians themselves was not involved in the case:
"These cases present no question concerning the immunity of
the Indian lands themselves from state taxation. There is no
possibility that ultimate liability for the taxes may fall upon the
owner of the land."'1 6 Furthermore, the insubstantiality of the
tax there in question seems to have been a factor in the Court's
decision; the Court found it difficult to imagine that the slight
taxation by Oklahoma would impair the federal government's
goal of 10developing
the oil leaseholds for the benefit of the
7
Indians.
Although the Texas Co. case did not purport to deal with
Indian governmental immunity, the Court was sensitive to the
special problems that Indian immunity, as opposed to federal
immunity, would create. As noted in United States v. Detroit, 0 8 it
was already settled by the time of Texas Co. that the indirect
financial burden a state tax might place on the federal government would not by itself invalidate that tax, even if the burden
were substantial. 0 9 In Texas Co., however, the Court nevertheless
emphasized the smallness of the tax involved, implicitly recognizing that a large tax could well interfere with the Indians' selfgovernment, even though it might not affect the much more
wealthy federal government."10
The Detroit case was relied on by both the district court and
the court of appeals in Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v.
County of Riverside"' in rejecting a lessee's claim of immunity
from state taxation. That claim was based mainly on the Indians'
governmental immunity. The case involved a suit by the Indians
themselves, seeking a ruling that holders of reservation leases
which "generate[d] practically all of the income available to" the
1005Id. at 365.
1 6 Id. at 353.
0
1 7 Id. at 351.
108 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
10 9Id. at 469.
11o336 U.S. at 351.
"1 306 F. Supp. 279 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
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Indians, 112 were immune from a state "possessory interest tax,"
essentially a property tax on the leaseholds. Even though this tax
was a substantial one which had a considerable effect on the
Indians' only source of income, and thus seriously impaired their
self-sufficiency, it was upheld by both the district and appellate
courts on the authority of Detroit. Dissenting, Judge Ely took
sharp issue with the reasoning of the majority of the court of
appeals. It was Judge Ely's view that Detroit did not address the
question of a conflict between an important federal policy and
state taxation of reservation lessees. 1 13 By his reasoning, Agua
Caliente Band of Mission Indians not only presented a conflict between the "federal policy of protecting Indian wards"' 14 and
state taxation, but also represented a situation in which the state
taxation was an onerous burden upon the Indians. 1 5
The approach to governmental immunity offered by Judge
Ely, while emphasizing the welfare of the Indians as part of a
federal policy rather than as a value in itself, 11 6 seems much
more consistent with the Supreme Court's carefully chosen language in Texas Co. than does the approach of the majority. Were
Judge Ely's approach applied to Indian mineral leases, the result
would be to invalidate much state taxation of lessees of Indian
land. The Crow Tribe in Montana, for instance, has substantial
deposits of coal on its reservation and on its most recent leases
the Tribe is to receive a royalty of seventeen and one-half cents
per ton. 17 The state of Montana imposes on the lessees taxes
substantially higher that this Indian royalty interest! 1 18 The
Montana taxes may indeed seriously impair the governmental
capabilities of the Indians by denying to the tribal government a
significant source of needed revenues." 9 If the power to tax is
not to be the power to destroy, 2 0 Montana's taxes, which are
112 306 F. Supp. at 281.

113 442 F.2d at 1188 (dissenting opinion).
114

Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1188.
,16 Cf McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
117R. Barsh &J. Henderson, supra note 4, at 8.
115

11

MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 84-1302 (Supp. 1974) assesses a tax of from twelve to

forty cents per ton of coal stripped, depending upon quality. Section 84-1501 (Supp.
1974) taxes corporations at a rate of 6/ percent of their net income. Section 84-301
(Supp. 1974) and section 84-302 (Supp. 1974) make the net proceeds of a coal mine
subject to local property taxes at 100 percent valuation.
119 Of course the level of state tax interference necessary to require invalidation of
state taxation should be a question of fact. It is a premise of this Comment that such a
showing would not in many case be a difficult matter.
120 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505 (1922); Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Olkahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530 (1916); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
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wholly unlike the mild one per cent gross production tax at issue
in Texas Co., should not be allowed to apply to lessees of the
Crow tribe's land. Absent state taxation, the Indians could exact
royalties from their lessees more than double what they are now
able to obtain.

12 1

The decision in Texas Co.,122 has certainly not foreclosed the
argument that the immunity of the Indian government from
state taxation is violated by economically burdensome state taxation of lessees of Indian lands. Obviously, the economic position
of each individual tribe would have to be assessed under the
approach suggested here, in order to determine whether state
taxation actually interferes with the functioning of the tribal
government.
2.

Lessee Immunity from State Taxation
Due to Tribal Taxation or Regulation
That a state has some power to tax lessees of Indian lands
under certain circumstances cannot be gainsaid after Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Texas Co..1 23 The issue whether a state can tax

in a way that interferes with a tribe's exercise of tribal taxing
24
power, however, has only very rarely been directly raised.
125
Williams v. Lee is the modern seminal case for determining
questions involving tribal sovereignty. Justice Black there articulated the standard for determining the validity of state regulations dealing with non-Indians' activities on Indian reservations:
"Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." 126 In most subsequent cases dealing with state action
Wheat.) 316 (1819); cf. Oklahoma State Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949);
Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928).
21
1 See note 117 supra.
122See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
123 336 U.S. 342 (1949); see text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
124 On one occasion when this issue was squarely presented, it was dismissed as an
aid to litigation (which, in that case, it apparently was). Agua Caliente Band of Mission
Indians v. County of Riverside, 306 F. Supp. 279 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). The court also made a cryptic reference to
Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954), apparently for
the proposition that California Indian tribes have less sovereignty than other tribes. If
the Agua Caliente Band court was suggesting that California tribes have lost their
sovereign right to tax due to 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970), it has some support by implication
from Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). The
Acosta court, however, disclaimed any intent to deal with the taxation issue. 126 Cal. App.
2d at 466, 272 P.2d at 98.
125 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
126Id. at 220.
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which arguably interfered with tribal government, 1 27 this principle has been either relied on or distinguished.
The Court has made clear in these subsequent cases that the
Williams test does not apply to state regulation of activities of
reservation Indians off the reservation, 128 nor does it apply to
state regulation or taxation of activities of reservation Indians on
the reservation. 29 In the former situation the states have broad
power to regulate; in the latter the tribe, absent federal law to
the contrary, has complete power.' 30 Concerning activities of
non-Indians on Indian reservations, however, "both the tribe
and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve
this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest
up to the point where tribal self-government would be
affected". 1 3 ' Thus, the Williams test is precisely applicable to the
problem of state taxation of lessees of Indian land.
In Texas Co. there was no allegation that the state tax interfered in any way with tribal self-government or even with tribal
revenues. Had the Court envisioned a Williams-type test in 1949,
it would not have changed the result of the case. In Thomas v.
Gay,' 3 2 recently cited by the Court as one of the leading cases on
the exertion of state sovereignty over non-Indians active on In-

127 See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 179 (1973); Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1962).
128 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
The Mescalero opinion, in holding the Indians there taxable, seems to have completely mistaken Congress' intent in enacting 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1970). Section 465 was
part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 985, § 5. It authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands for Indians and Indian tribes, and provided
that tide to any such lands should be taken in the name of the United States in trust for
the Indians, "and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation."
The Court held that this language did not make the acquired lands part of the
reservation, and that the tax exemption applied only to property taxes, not to taxes on
Indian income from activities on the acquired lands.
On its face the Court's crabbed interpretation of the tax exemption clause in the
statute seems questionable. The legislative history indicates that the Cort's underlying
premise-that the acquired lands did not become part of the reservation-was wrong.
The Senate debate on this issue clearly shows that land acquired pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act for a tribe was to become a part of the reservation. As Senator
Thomas stated, "section 5 of the bill provides for . . . acquiring additional lands for
Indian reservations." 3 W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES,
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1918 (1973).
129 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
130 Id.

"' Id. at 179.
132 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
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dian reservations, 1 33 the Court implied that an application of a
Williams-type test to state taxation of Indian lessees might invalidate the state tax.
Thomas upheld an Oklahoma Territory property tax on
non-Indian cattle grazing on Indian lands, theorizing that any
effect of the tax on the tribe was "too remote and indirect to be
1 34
deemed a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians."'
The Court in Thomas was careful, however, to differentiate the
property tax on the cattle from a tax on the business of grazing
or a direct tax on the income of the Indians. In this way it
distinguished Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,'35 which had
held that a tax on the income derived from municipal bonds
clearly affected the ability of a municipality to raise money, and
was therefore constitutionally
invalid as "a burthen on the opera36
tions of government."'

Although the decision in Pollock 3 7 has since been called into
question, on both policy 138 and constitutional' 39 grounds, its rationale still seems strongly applicable to state-Indian relations.
State power to tax reservation activities is limited by the Williams
test and by the principle of Indian sovereignty. Where state taxation of reservation activities directly interferes with effective
Indian self-government, both Pollock and Thomas would seem to
support invalidation of that tax.
In 1965, the Supreme Court more explicitly addressed the
issue of state taxation of non-Indians on Indian reservations, but
the case seemed to focus on factors other than tribal self-govern140
ment. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission
dealt with Arizona's attempt to apply its gross receipts tax to
congressionally licensed traders on the Navajo reservation. The
Court, without expressly relying on the Williams test, held the tax
invalid for three reasons: (1) The tax put financial burdens upon
the trading post and, indirectly, upon the Indians in addition to
an Indian tax prescribed by the tribe pursuant to its authority to
133411 U.S. at 168.

,34 169 U.S. at 273. This direct/indirect distinction, taken from interstate commerce
cases, was at least in part rejected in Texas Co., which held that the inquiry must be
whether the tax effects substantial "interferences with governmental functions." 336 U.S.
at 365. But cf. id. at 353.
135 157 U.S.'429 (1895).
136 Id. at 586.
137 The Pollock decision has been codified in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
138 Cf. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS
39

See B. BITKER & L.
(4th ed. 1972).
140 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
1

83 (1969).
176
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charge a trader "such fees, etc., as it may deem appropriate.' ' 41
(2) "[S]ince federal legislation has left the State with no duties or
responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of
levying this tax." 14 2 (3) The state tax here in question would
seriously interfere with Congress'
statutory plan in an area essen43
Congress.
by
preempted
tially
In its decision in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 1 44 the
Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished Warren Trading Post as
limited to the third rationale listed above. In reversing the
Arizona court's decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with this
restrictive interpretation: 1 45 "The tax . . . was invalidated . . .
because 'from the very first days of our Government, the Federal
Government had been permitting the Indians largely to govern
themselves, free from state interference.' 146 This freedom from
state interference, the Court went on, has likewise relieved the
states of the responsibilities of regulating activity on Indian
reservations. 147 The Court thus read Warren Trading Post to
mean (consistently with a there unstated Williams test) that where
an activity by non-Indians on the reservation is regulated and
taxed by the tribe, a state has no right to tax that activity.
Although the state tax seemed low in Warren Trading Post
(two percent of gross income) 14 and thus perhaps was not a
heavy enough burden to violate the Indians' governmental
immunity, 1 49 it did interfere with the tribe's regulatory and tax
powers and under that theory the substantiality of the burden
was not relevant.
The Supreme Court's McClanahan decision makes the rights
of the tribes and the states seem fairly clear with regard to taxation of lessees of Indian land under a Williams-Warren Trading
Post test. A state tax is surely an interference with Indian tribal
government when the Indians want to tax the lessees themselves
but are hindered or precluded because of the state tax. For the
state so to restrict the power of the tribe to tax is clearly beyond
"the point where tribal self-government [is] affected."' 5 0
Id. at 691, 689-90 (footnote omitted); 25 C.F.R. § 250.27c (1975).
U.S. at 691 (footnote omitted).
1 3Id. at 690-91.
14 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971), rev'd , 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
145 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 n.6 (1973).
46
1 Id. at 170.
7
14 Id. at 170 n.6.
148 380 U.S. at 685.
49
1
See text accompanying notes 101-23 supra.
1-0 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
141

142 380
4
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Although interference with the power of the tribe to tax is
the clearest example of a state tax going beyond the bounds of
the Williams test, the interference a state tax could create with
the freedom of the tribe to exercise its regulatory powers may
also justify invalidation of the tax. If, for example, tribes were to
accept lower royalties in exchange for a lessee's promise to give
preference to Indians in its hiring practices, the impact a state
tax could have upon this Indian regulatory action should cause
the tax to be held invalid. Thus a provision such as the one in
the Navajo Tribal Code declaring that all leases granted by the
tribe are not subject to any state taxes, direct or indirect, 1 1 is
presumptively valid because "[t]he assertion by the states of the
power to tax leases granted by the Navajo Tribe threatens to
impair the Navajo Tribe's authority to regulate businesses and
industries in the Navajo Nation, through their leases .... ",152
B.

Exceptions to the Prohibition of State Taxation of Lessees

1. Areas of State Regulation
One situation in which the states may be able to tax even in
the face of a tribal tax or regulation arises when the state, and
not the federal government or the tribe, is acting significantly
(and, it is assumed, lawfully) to regulate an activity of nonIndians on the reservation. For example, the receipts from the
small gross production tax in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas
Co. 153 were being used to fund the state system of oil regulation
in which the Indian lessees participated. Such a tax seems justified under the approach offered in Warren Trading Post and
McClanahan, but under this same approach a tax that raises revenue in excess of the amount needed to fund the state's regulatory system may not be justified. Except for small state taxes to
finance regulatory bodies overseeing Indian lessees, it appears
that most state taxation is of the latter sort.
2.

Federal Statutory Exceptions Allowing State Taxation
of Lessees of Mineral Interests
Even if state taxation would be otherwise precluded by the
considerations discussed above, 154 Congress could still affirmatively allow states to tax lessees of Indian lands if it wished. The
5 NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE § 704 (1972).
Preamble, Navajo Tribal Council Res. CMY-43-70 (May 19, 1970), following 5
NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE § 704 (1972).
153336 U.S. 342 (1949); see notes 105-07 supra.
154 See text accompanying notes 101-52 supra.
151

152
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most recent case holding that Congress has indeed permitted
state taxation of lessees of mineral interests on Indian land is
155
This case inIndustrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Commission.
of all
proceeds
gross
the
on
volved a state tax of one percent
156 the tax was applied to income of nonmining operations;
Indians derived from mining Indian lands. The court began
by stating the Williams test15 7 and questionably implied that it
was too obvious for discussion that a one percent tax on a
proceeds does not interfere with reservation selflessee's gross158
government.
The court then further held that "[b]y 43 Stat. 244, 25
U.S.C. § 398, unalloted lands on Indian reservations may be
leased ... and the production of oil and gas and other minerals
from such lands may be taxed by the state in which they are
located in all respects the same as production from unrestricted
lands."'159 The court also held that the one percent tax applied to
gross proceeds before the Indians' royalties were deducted, because section 398160 did not specifically state that royalties should
be deducted before computation of the tax.
The court's holding in Industrial Uranium Co. was based on
the interpretation of the same statute given by the Supreme
Court in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization,' 6 in which state taxation of a mineral lease was upheld.
Some doubt about this historical interpretation is raised, however, if only because the Court in British-American Oil did not
discuss and apparently did not perceive, the significance of
statutory language suggesting that Congress had intended only
to allow the taxation of Indian royalties deriving from mineral
leases, not the taxation of the lessees of Indian lands.
Both the language and legislative history of section 398
merit closer examination. The statute provides as follows:
Unallotted land on Indian reservations [with certain exceptions] subject to lease for mining purposes...
l~95 Ariz. 130, 387 P.2d 1013 (1963).
156

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 42-1309, 1310 (1956), as amended, ARIZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 42-1309, 1310 (Supp. 1975-76).

117"State laws apply on reservations unless such application would interfere with
reservation self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by federal law." 95
Ariz. at 130, 132-33, 387 P.2d at 1013-14 (1963) (citing Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962)).
158 95 Ariz. at 132-33, 387 P.2d at 1015.

159
Id. at 133, 387 P.2d at 1015.
16025 U.S.C. § 398 (1970).
161299 U.S. 159 (1936).
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under section 397 of this title may be leased . .. for a
period of not to exceed ten years, and as much longer
as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities ...
Provided, That the production of oil and gas and other
minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in
which said lands are located in all respects the same as
production on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause to be
paid the tax so assessed against the royalty interests on
said lands: Provided, however, That such tax shall not
become a lien or charge of any kind or character
against
16 2
the land or the property of the Indian owner.
It would seem strange for a statute authorizing a tax on lessees
of Indian land to order that the tax be paid out of the royalty
1 63
interest of the Indians.
When the proviso dealing with taxability was added to section 398, a short debate followed during which Representative
Crampton remarked: "[T]he important provision is that with reference to the taxation of the royalties, the Indians' income,
from oil development.' 1 64 And in reference to an identical
16225 U.S.C. § 398 (1970). 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1970) states:
Where lands are occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the
same, and which lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes,....
the same may be leased by authority of council speaking for such Indians, for a
period not to exceed . . . ten years for mining purposes. . . , subject to the

approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
The "bought and paid for" language is
by uniform administrative practice and by judicial decision ... construed as not
confined to lands aquired by Indians through the payment of a consideration in
money, but equally including lands reserved for Indians in return for a cession
or surender by them of other lands, possessions, or rights.
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 164 (1936)
(dictum) (footnote omitted).
Reservations were and are of two classes. "Bought and paid for" reservations are
those which the Indians obtain in a trade, typically one whereby they would give up
much of their land in exchange for the right to keep the rest of it, along with a promise of
friendship and support from the federal government. Thus, even though the Indians
received no new land in a deal such as this, the land they retained would be considered
"bought and paid for." All treaty and almost all legislatively established reservations are
considered "bought and paid for."
Executive-order reservations did not require that Indians give up anything. The
typical one, is illustrated by the situation of the Navajos, whose treaty reservation of three
million acres was extended by executive order to thirteen million acres. See 68 CONG.
REC. 4579 (1927) (remarks of Representative Hayden).
Executive-order reservations are covered by sections 398a-e rather than by section
398. See note 175 infra.
163 See A. McLANE, supra note 2, §§ 179, 182.

16465 CONG. REC. 6844 (1924) (remarks of Representative Crampton).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:491

proviso in another bill dealing only with unallotted lands in the
Kaw reservation in Oklahoma, Senator Curtis said: "The amendment [adding the proviso] simply provides that the royalties derived from the leasing of the oil land shall be taxable to the State
without a lien upon the land."1 65 The Court in British-American
Oil made no attempt to explain the import of the royalty tax language, although that language stands out in the admittedly brief
legislative history of section 398.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co. ,166 the Court agreed
that "Congress' purpose in enacting ... statutes [whose royalty
tax language was similar to that of section 398] was the removal
of the immunities of the Indians themselves" in response to the
"favorable economic position of the particular Indians" there
involved. 167 The Court then added, without discussion, that
"[t]he resulting removal of the immunity of private lessees ' of
68
those Indian lands was an incidental effect of this legislation."'
British-American Oil nowhere referred to the removal of
lessee's immunity as an incidental effect, but rather made clear
that such immunity was dissolved directly by a similarly phrased
statute. Although offhandedly and through dictum, the Court in
Texas Co. seems to have faced for the first time the obvious
difference between authorizing taxation of Indian royalties and
authorizing taxation of reservation lessees. 169 Texas Co.'s formu165 Id. 6867 (remarks of Senator Curtis).
.16 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
167 Id. at 366-67. But cf. 68 CONG. REc. 4578 (1927) (remarks of Representative
Carter): "To say that the Navajo Indian is wealthy is to make a man laugh who knows
anything about their condition."
168 336 U.S. at 367 (emphasis supplied).
169 One of the statutes referred to by the Court. 336 U.S. at 366 n.40, provides in
part:
That the production of oil and gas and other minerals on such restricted
lands may be taxed by the State of Oklahoma in all respects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized
and directed to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the royalty interests
of the respective Indian owners in such production from the royalties or from
any other individual Indian funds held under his supervision belonging to the
Indian owner of the land.... Act of May 27, 1924, ch. 200, § 1, 43 Stat. 176.
However, 45 Stat. 476 is worded somewhat differently, providing in part:
That all minerals . . . from restricted allotted land of members of the Five
Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma... shall be subject to all State and Federal taxes of
every kind and character the same as those produced from lands owned by
other citizens of the State of Oklahoma; and the Secretary of the Interior is
hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid . . . the tax or taxes
so assessed against the royalty interest of the respective Indian owners in such
oil, gas, and other mineral production. Act of May 10, 1928, ch. 517, § 3, 45
Stat. 495.
If the point made by the Court applies to these provisions, it necessarily applies to
section 398.
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lation of the issue in this manner raises questions about the continued validity of British-American Oil.
In stating that lessee immunity was removed incidentally,
the Court in Texas Co. may have thought that to tax Indians on
their royalty income from mineral production without taxing the
private lessees would protect the private party more than the
Indian "ward." This conclusion, however, cannot withstand
economic analysis because of the significant effect which a heavy
gross production tax against lessees might have on the reservation leasing activities.
At the time the royalty tax provisos were put into divers
leasing statutes, 170 lessees of Indian land had immunity from
state taxation because they were still considered instrumentalities
of the federal government.' 7 1 Under this doctrine the federal
purpose which would potentially be disrupted by a state tax on
lessees is the Government's interest in negotiating "the best
terms it can get for its wards." A state tax on the Indians themselves would not affect the ability of the Government to
negotiate leases.' 72 Thus, it is possible that Congress wished to
allow the states to gain some revenues by taxing the Indians, but
also to maintain the lessees' immunity from tax in order to protect the federal government's interest in negotiating the best possible lease agreements. This makes more practical sense when
one considers that Congress may have been under the impression that the Indians affected by section 398's proviso were
wealthy.' 73 By permitting a tax on royalties only, the federal
government would facilitate any state interests in taxing wealthy
Indians and would still keep a guardian's grasp of the economic
development of the reservations.17 4 A tax on reservation lessees,
17'Note

169 & text accompanying note 162 supra.

171See Choctaw, 0. & G.R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914); see text accompany-

ing notes 10 1-52 supra.
172 Cf. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931) (holding that once royalties have been
distributed to the Indians they are no longer exempt from taxation as federal instrumentalities).
73 See note 167 supra & accompanying text.
174 The Court's reasoning in Texas Co. may have been that without Indian immunity
from taxation the legal basis for lessee immunity collapsed. In other words, if the reason
the states could not tax the lessees was that such a tax would ultimately be a burden on
the Indians, then to remove the immunity of the latter must necessarily destroy the
immunity of the former. This argument, though attractive on its face, fails to note that
the federal instrumentality doctrine was based on the federal government's immunity
and on the lessees' dealings with the federal government.
Absent a fully viable instrumentality doctrine, the lack of federal authoriztion of a
state tax on reservation lessees is significant (1) to the extent it may be disruptive of
Indian self-government, and thus in a broad sense disruptive of general Indian immunity
(in areas other than royalty taxation where immunity has been foreclosed); and (2) to the
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if excessive, could detrimentally affect production on Indian
land, and thus depress economic activity.
Inasmuch as the possibility of taxation exclusively of Indian
royalty interests was not even addressed in British-American Oil,
although the issue is fairly raised by the statutory language,
British-American Oil should not be considered a decisive interpretation. Certainly it may be said that the Texas Co. theory that
taxation of lessees flows "incidentally" from taxation of Indians'
royalties is without apparent justification. Section 398 deserves
close reexamination before it is interpreted
as granting to states
175
the power to tax reservation lessees.
extent it is disruptive of Indian taxation or an Indian regulatory purpose. Text accompanying notes 101-52 supra.
17I Section 398c, dealing with executive-order reservations, seems on its face to mandate a different result for these reservations. It states:
Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or
assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations in the
same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes
may be levied against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals, and
royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to
cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided,
That such taxes shall not become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or
other property of such Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 398c (1970). Although this statute seems to give states plenary authority to
tax mineral lessees on executive-order reservations, this was not the intent of Congress.
The pupose of this provision was to eliminate the federal instrumentality doctrine with
regard to executive-order reservations, but not necessarily to give the states unrestricted
power to tax. Thus, as stated in H.R. REP. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1927):
The terms relating to taxation used in section 3 [398c] of the bill are taken
from the proviso to section 32 of the general leasing act (41 Stat. 450) which has
been construed by the Supreme Court in the case of Mid-Northern Oil Co. v.
Walker, Treasurer of the State of Montana, as follows: "We think that the
proviso plainly discloses the intention of Congress that persons and corporations
contracting with the United States under the [general leasing] act should notfor
that reason be exempt from any form of State taxation." (emphasis supplied).
Thus, section 398c anticipates Texas Co. insofar as executive-order reservations are concerned. It does not foreclose, however, factors other than the federal instrumentality
doctrine from acting to limit the power of states to tax lessees of Indian mineral interests.
Text accompanying notes 101-52 supra. Executive-order reservations should not be
treated any differently from "bought and paid for" reservations for purposes of state
taxation.
Because Congress' purpose in enacting sections 398a-e was "to put an Executiveorder reservation on the same footing with a treaty [or legislative] reservation," 68 CONG.
REC. 4579 (1927)(remarks of Representative Hastings); id. 4569-70 (remarks of Representative Hayden), it might seem anomalous to interpret the somewhat ambiguous
words of 25 U.S.C. § 398 differently from the seemingly clear language of section 398c.
The legislative history, shows, however, that Congress was intentionally withdrawing the
protection of the federal instrumentality doctrine from lessees on executive-order reservations in enacting section 398c, something it never discussed when it enacted section
398. This distinction was not due to any change of heart by Congress between 1924 and
1927, but rather to the influence of two groups of congressmen who for quite different
reasons were opposed to tax-free status for lessees on executive-order reservations. One
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V.

INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND No-TAX CLAUSES:
CONTRACTING AWAY THE TAXING POWER

It has been put forth that the Indian tribes have, as
sovereigns, the power to tax anyone doing business on their
reservations, and that absent express congressional authorization
the states should generally not be allowed to tax heavily the
76
operations of non-Indians on reservations. As noted above,'
however, leases of Indian land made between tribal councils and
outside mining, oil, or power interests often contain a clause declaring that royalties provided in the lease are in lieu of any
taxes and that the Indians covenant not to tax the outsiders in
any way for the term of the lease. Obviously this is an important
safeguard for any lessee given the widely held assumption that
lessees are subject to state taxation. If the arguments presented
above are accepted, however, and the states are forbidden to levy
all but modest taxes on lessees, the basic purpose of the no-tax
clauses-to insulate the non-Indian interests from taxation by
1 77
both state and tribal governments-would no longer exist.
In any case, if a tribal government were to attempt to tax
lessees despite the no-tax agreements, resistance could be expected. As a result of the unique status of Indian tribes, however, the lessees might well be left without any remedy against
the lessor tribe other than termination of the entire contract.
group felt that while Indians may have been clearly entitled to their treaty reservations,
executive-order reservations were a gift to the Indians by the federal government (specifically the Executive branch) in derogation of the prerogatives of Congress and at the
expense of the states. The purpose of sections 398a-e was to extend to the Indians, in
addition to the surface rights of hunting, agriculture, and occupancy they already enjoyed on executive-order reservations, the right to sell the mineral interests in these
reservations for their own benefit. By permitting state power to tax the income from
these mineral interests which were transferred to the Indians, section 398c probably
served to satisfy many of those who were opposed to a "complete giveaway." See generally
68 CONG. REC. 4569-81 (1927).
Another group of congressmen was opposed to opening executive-order reservations
to mineral leasing because it felt this to be an unwarranted boon to the oil and coal
companies. Id. 4576-78. Section 398c served to assuage their opposition by providing that
these companies would not enjoy the further advantage of immunity from state taxes
under the federal instrumentality doctrine.
Barsh and Henderson argue that notwithstanding sections 398 and 398c, see note
175 supra, the states cannot tax either the Indians or their lessees because "any State tax
which substantially interferes with the collection of tribal tax or the application of the
proceeds of trible [sic] production to tribal welfare, would be in conflict with the most
recent federal law." R. Barsh and J. Henderson, supra note 4, at 7-8; cf. Comment, supra
note 1. This conslusion, that sections 398 and 398c have been implicitly repealed, seems
unnecessary, however, since Congress had no intention of having states use these sections
in derogation of Indian sovereignty.
176See note 99 supra & accompanying text.
77
1 See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
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This result, which seems startling at first, follows logically from
either of two attributes of sovereignty retained by the Indians:
(1) tribal sovereign immunity, and (2) the inalienability of
sovereign powers, such as the tax and police powers, especially in
light of the Indians' freedom from the restrictions of the United
States Constitution.
A.

The Right of a Tribe to Repudiate Contracts

1. The Absence of a Forum to Challenge Repudiation:
Tribal Sovereign Immunity
If a tribe were to pass a law taxing lessees of its land who
had been promised freedom from such taxation, the tribe would
clearly be in breach of contract. The difficult question is whether
this conduct could be challenged by a lessee. Lessee could not
sue in a tribal court, which would be bound to enforce its tribe's
laws unless they violated the tribe's constitution (if one exitsed).
Indeed, lessee might simply be barred from suing in the tribal
court because a sovereign can control access to its courts as it
wishes. 17 8 Although the matter is not free of all doubt, there
does not appear to be a remedy for the lessee in state or federal
court either.
The case of Williams v. Lee' 7 9 seems controlling on the question whether the tribe could be sued in state court. This case
considered the related issue whether an Arizona resident could
maintain a suit in state court on a debt due from a reservation
Indian. The Supreme Court looked to the criminal jurisdiction
precedents discussed above 8 0 and concluded that Arizona's
assertion of jurisdiction was an interference with tribal
self-government. 8 ' Congress had not acted to give Arizona
jurisdiction over the Indians. The standard applied by the Court
(whether the state action would "infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves"' 82 ) applies even more clearly to a
suit against a tribe for breach of contract.
In the absence of a specific provision giving consent on behalf of the Indians, a lessee's access to federal court for suit
against the tribe also seems foreclosed.' 8 3 Justice Brandeis inti178

Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1895).

179 358

U.S. 217 (1959).

1 0 See text accompanying notes 55-66 supra.
181358 U.S. at 222.
1
12Id. at 223.
183 See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 491-95.
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mated this to be the case in Turner v. United States,184 in which
the decision that the Creek Indian tribe could not be sued was
based on the lack of a substantive right rather than a lack of
jurisdiction over the tribe.' 85 The Supreme Court faced the issue
more directly in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.' 8 6 In that case, the lower court had granted judgment on a
counterclaim against the United States, which had brought suit
on behalf of the Indians for money due on a surety's bond
guaranteeing lease royalties. Although the tribe had dissolved
prior to the suit, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
public policy that had exempted both sovereignties (the tribe and
the United States) from suit without consent continued to operate after dissolution. 18 7 Lower federal courts have recognized the
significance of this decision and have held that the Indian tribes
have sovereign immunity coextensive with that of the United
88
States.'
Leaving a lessee who contracts with an Indian tribe without
a remedy for a breach may seem harsh, but the doctrine of
immunity leads logically to this conclusion. In Hans v.
Louisiana189 the Supreme Court, concluding that the suability of
a state without its consent was "unknown to the law," quoted the
words of Daniel Webster:
"The security for state loans," he said, "is the plighted
faith of the State as a political community. It rests on
the same basis as other contracts with established governments, the same basis, for example, as loans made by
the United States under the authority of Congress; that
is to say, the good faith of the government making the
loan, and its ability to fulfill its engagements."'' 90
It might be argued, however, that the Indian tribes have
implicitly consented to be sued in a breach of contract situation,
or that Congress has implicitly consented for them. Yet the recent Supreme Court case of Employees of the Department of Public
184248 U.S. 354 (1919) (dictum).
185 Id. at 358. The suit in Turner was for damages arising out of the destruction of a
non-Indian's property by a mob of Creeks, in which certain Creek tribal officers participated.
186309 U.S. 506 (1940).
187

Id. at 512.

1'8 Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972)

(dictum); see Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370
F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mont. 1962).
189 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

190Id. at 16 (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Baring Bros. & Co., Oct. 16,
1839).
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Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 19 ' held
that congressional removal of state immunity (where Congress
has such power under the commerce clause) should not be inferred from silence, but must be explicitly stated. 192 And Congress has never explicitly withdrawn the Indians' sovereign immunity in this class of cases.
Of course, allowing sovereign immunity to insulate an Indian tribe against suit for a breach of contract will, if the Indians
choose to exercise it, impair their credibility for future dealings
with non-Indians. But this does not indicate that the approach
should not be taken; rather, it cautions against abuse. Realizing
the possible adverse ramifications of evading a contract by asserting immunity, a tribe will probably not cause a breach unless the
contract's terms are so obviously repugnant to the Indians' interest that a prospective party to a future contract could not expect
a similar bargain to result from fair and equitable negotiation.
2. The Inalienability of Sovereign Powers
Assuming an aggrieved lessee can overcome the hurdle of
Indian sovereign immunity and make his way into federal court,
he may still face considerable problems: The tribe may assert
that the no-tax clause is void because it purports to contract away
a power inherent in the tribe's sovereign nature.
a. The Taxing Power
The general rule is that a sovereign body cannot legislate in
such a way as to bind a future legislature. Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, wrote:
To say that the legislature may pass irrepealable laws, is
to say that it may alter the very constitution from which
it derives its authority; since, in so far as one legislature
could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it could
in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its
successors; and the process might be repeated, until,
one by one, the subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from their control, and the constitu191 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
192 Id. at 287 (Marshall,

J., concurring); cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964).
Although in the case of states of the Union this careful approach is based on the
eleventh amendment, the federal policy of recognizing and encouraging Indian
sovereignty should mandate application of the same approach to Indian tribes. See notes
72-75 supra & accompanying text; cf. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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tional provision that the legislative power shall be vested
in two houses would be ... rendered ineffectual. 193
However, the general rule is modified, Cooley continues,
by an important provision of the Constitution of the
United States, forbidding the States passing any laws
impairing the obligation of contracts. Legislative acts
are sometimes in substance contracts between the State
and the party who is to derive some right under them,
and they are not the less under the protection of the
clause quoted because of having assumed this form....
And it now seems to be settled . . . that a State, by
contract to that effect, based upon a consideration, may
exempt the property of an individual or corporation
from taxation for any specified period, or even
permanently. 94
The state and federal courts have accepted and recognized both
of these important propositions. 95
Although the general rule against irrepealable legislation is
applicable to Indian tribal governments, the specific exception
grounded in the contract clause is not. As has been shown above,
Indian tribes are not bound by constitutional limitations unless
Congress clearly and explicitly acts to bind them.' 96 And Congress has thus far chosen not to do so with regard to a tribe's
power to impair the obligation of contracts. The Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968197 has been correctly held not to bind tribes
193 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 247 (8th ed. 1927) (footnote omit-

ted). Though Cooley is referring to state power, the principle applies with equal force to
any sovereign government.
Cooley continues:
"Acts of Parliament," says Blackstone, "derogatory from the power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not ....

Because the legislature, being in truth the

sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority; it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been if its
ordinances could bind a subsequent Parliament. And upon the same principle,
Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt these restraining
clauses which endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. 'When
you repeal the law itself,' says he, 'you at the same time repeal the prohibitory
clause which guards against such repeal.' "
Id. 247-48 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90).
194 Id. 248.
195 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1890); New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877); Paterson v. Dempsey,
152 Conn. 431, 207 A.2d 739 (1965); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah
108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949); cf. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Butler, 105 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1939).
196 See generally text accompanying notes 33-46 supra.
197 Note 47 supra.
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to limitations not specified therein. 198 Thus it would seem that
an Indian tribe can repeal any legislation it has the power to
make.
b.

The Police Power
Even if the contract clause were held applicable to an Indian
tribe, a reasonable tax on lessees would not so impair the obligation of contract as to be unconstitutional. Although bound by the
contract clause, a state cannot bargain away its police power. 199
The question at hand is whether no-tax clauses in Indian leases
constitute such a surrender of the police power.
In Stone v. Mississippi,2 00 the state had granted a lottery company a twenty-five year charter under which to conduct its business. Within that twenty-five-year period Mississippi amended its
constitution to prohibit the legislature from authorizing lotteries,
and passed anti-lottery legislation. Chief Justice Waite, speaking
for the Court, said a state could make "irrevocable grants of
property and franchises" only if they did not "impair the supreme authority to make laws for the right government of the
State ....,,201 In a general discussion, Chief Justice Waite wrote:
We have held, not, however, without strong opposition
at times, that the [contract] clause protected a corporation in its charter exemptions from taxation. While
taxation is in general necessary for the support of
government, it is not part of the government itself.
Government was not organized for the purposes of taxation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of
government. As such, taxation becomes an incident to
the exercise of the legitmate functions of government,
but nothing more. No government dependent on taxationfor
support can bargainaway its whole power of taxation,for that
would be substantially abdication. All that has been determined thus far is, that for a consideration it may, in the
exercise of a reasonable discretion, and for the public
v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv.
Corp., 248 U.S. 372 (1919); Pennsylvania Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917);
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898) (dictum); Stone v. Mississippi,
101 U.S. 814 (1879).
200 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
201Id. at 817 (quoting Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 667
198 Groundhog
199E.g.,

(1866)).
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good, surrender
particular.20 2

a

part

of its

powers

in

this

Total surrender of taxing power may in this way amount to a
surrender of the police power. A state cannot be held to have
bargained away so much of its tax power that it is left unable to
carry on its functions as a government.
So long as an exercise of the police power bears a substantial
relationship to a legitimate state purpose, it makes no difference
that the legislation has the effect of modifying or even abrogating contracts already in effect. In Stephenson v. Binford,20 3 involving state regulation of minimum shipping rates, the Court ruled
that the relevant contracts "are to be regarded as having been
made subject to the future exercise of the constitutional power
20 4
of the state.
Similarly, legislation enacted during the Great Depression
limiting the foreclosure rights of mortgagees of real property
withstood a contract clause challenge in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.20 5 Though the Court hedged its decision
with findings that the state had done its best to safeguard the
interests of the mortgagees, its language was expansive:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to f&x obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worth while,-a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had20progressive
rec6
ognition in the decisions of this Court.
If a government were in extremis, it is hard to envision that this
language and the underlying analysis would not permit it to levy
reasonable taxes in spite of a contractual promise not to do so.
To prohibit such taxes would be to allow the destruction of the
government itself, rendering meaningless the protection against
impairment of contracts.
202 Id. at 820 (dictum) (emphasis supplied).
203 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
204

Id.at 276.

205 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
20

6Id.at 435.
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Blaisdell, although addressing only temporary emergency
legislation, has not been read narrowly and was held to control
in Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association, °7 which involved a permanent New Jersey statute changing the rights of
shareholders of building and loan associations. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the state's legislation, read Blaisdell as having
reasserted the "rule that all contracts are made subject to the
paramount authority" of the state to "safeguard vital interests of
its people. ' 20 8 A state's authority "is not limited to 0health,
morals
2 9
and safety. It extends to economic needs as well.
The foregoing analysis has sought to show that under some
circumstances contracting away state tax power can be equivalent
to contracting away the police power. Inasmuch as a state may
disregard existing contracts if necessary for a reasonable exercise
of the police power, those contractual limitations on taxing
which amount to limitations on the police power cannot be absolutely binding on a state. It follows that a tribe may, if necessary,
disregard no-tax clauses in leases in order to exercise its police
powers to provide for the welfare of its people. This Comment
does not undertake to prove that any particular tribe could meet
this burden today, but merely seeks to demonstrate that the contract clause, even if held applicable to Indian tribes, would not
be an absolute bar to tribal claims that no-tax clauses may be
unenforceable.
B.

The Due Process Argument Against Allowing Repudiation

One interesting argument could be made against the power
of a tribe to repudiate a no-tax clause. It could be asserted that a
violation of a no-tax clause deprives the lessee of a property interest in contravention of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which does
210
prohibit a tribe from taking property without compensation.
Even if the lessees are said to have property interests in a
no-tax clause, such interests would still not be absolute. Some of
the cases cited above in which contract clause violations were
alleged also involved allegations that the states were taking property without compensation and hence without due process of
law. 211 The same analysis used to sustain the legislation under
the contract clause was used in the due process context: neither
207 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
208
20

Id. at 38.
9 Id. at 38-39 (footnotes omitted).
210 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1970); see note 46 supra.
211 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372 (1919).
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clause restricts a government from regulating property in the
public interest. Furthermore, a reasonable tax, although impairing the value of a lease, does not destroy the lease and would not
really constitute a taking. An analogous question is presented by
ordinary zoning regulation which may undeniably impair property values but which nonetheless has been held not to in2 12
volve a taking without compensation.
C. Conclusion
An Indian tribe should be permitted in some circumstances
to repudiate a no-tax clause, even though the lessee would be left
without a remedy. If the contract clause is not applicable to a
tribe, it could apparently repudiate at will, though this would
likely not be done for fear of impairing the tribe's credibility. 2 13
If the contract clause or the due process clause is held to apply to
tribal government, repudiation should still be possible, at least if
a showing can be made that a tax is reasonably necessary to
enable a tribe to carry out its functions as a sovereign governmental body.
VI.

TRIBAL RIGHTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES As TRUSTEE

Even if all the arguments advanced in this Comment so far
are rejected, an Indian tribe should be able to recover damages
from the United States for not acting in the best interests of the
tribe in negotiating leases, or in approving unfavorable leases
made by the tribes themselves. Ever since Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia2 14 held Indian tribes to be "domestic dependent
nations," 21 5 the United States has been held to have a special
relationship to the tribes. That case described the Indians as
existing "in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. '21 6 Though this
may be a somewhat simplistic description of a complex, indeed a
unique relationship, 17 a special relationship of dependency on
the United States undoubtedly does exist and has been recognized by the courts repeatedly. 21 8 Out of this relationship the
212 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
213See text following note 193 supra.
214 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
2 15
Id. at 17.
216

Id.

217 FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 557-58.

218E.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Navajo
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United States acquires a special responsibility that may be accurately described as a fiduciary duty.
A. Ability of Indian Tribes to Sue the United States
for a Breach of Fiduciaiy Duty
Before discussing the nature of the duty owed by the United
States to the Indian tribes, the question whether the United
States may be sued for a breach of such a duty must be examined. The United States, of course, may not be sued without
its consent. 2 19 In 1946, Congress granted to Indian tribes the
right to sue the federal government for claims arising out of
their dealings with the United States prior to that year. 220 For
those claims arising after 1946, finding consent becomes a bit
more difficult; yet the right of tribes to sue the United States
both in federal district courts and in the Court of Claims has
been recognized.
The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over claims against the
United States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort .... -221 In Mason v. United States 222 this provision alone was
relied on to provide the Court of Claims with jurisdiction to hear
a case in which the Osage Indians claimed the United States had
breached its fiduciary duty by paying certain Oklahoma estate
taxes. But if this provision were not enough, there is explicit
statutory authorization for Indians to bring suit against the
United States in the Court of Claims:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim
against the United States accruing after August 13,
1946, in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable
group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States ...whenever such claim
is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States, or Executive orders of the President,
Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Seneca Nation v. United States, 173
Ct. Cl. 917 (1965); Seneca Nation v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 912 (1965); Oneida Tribe
v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964).
219 This result flows from the general doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., The
Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922) (Holmes, J. ) (tort claim).
220 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a-w (1970), as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a-w (Supp. II, 1972) and 25
U.S.C. §§ 70a-w (Supp. III, 1973); see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 356-59.
221 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II, 1972).
222 461 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
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or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the
claimant were not an Indian
Court of Claims if the
22 3
tribe, band or group.
In Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States22 4 this provision was
construed to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction to grant
monetary damages but not equitable relief.
District courts also have cognizance over Indian claims
against the United States. In ManchesterBand of Pomo Indians, Inc.
v. United States, 22 5 the government claimed that tribes seeking
relief for a breach of fiduciary duty had no redress except in
the Court of Claims. The court rejected the argument, however,
on several theories. First, the court held that it had jurisdiction
under the statute that confers on district courts in actions where
the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000, a jurisdiction similar to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.22 6 Second,
and more important, district courts explicitly have been given
power over actions against the United States brought by Indian
tribes.2 2 7 The court also relied on a statute giving district courts
power to order federal officers to perform their duties. 22 8 And
finally the court determined that the Indian band qualified as a
person aggrieved by an agency action under section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 229 A tribe thus could seek review
of the actions of various officials in the Department of the Interior; and a district court could, under section 706, either compel agency action which had been delayed, or set aside certain
agency actions. 230 This last capability suggests that leases made
or approved by the Secretary of the Interior may be set aside by
a court if his action can be shown to be "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law .... "231
Most of these arguments were accepted by the Ninth Circuit
in Rockbridge v. Lincoln. 23 2 In that case, the Navajo Indians sued
to require the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the area di223 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
224 174 Ct. Cl. 483 (1966).

225 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
226 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
227 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970). This statute is similar in scope to 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(1970). See text accompanying note 223 supra.
228 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).

229 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
230 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2) (1970).
231 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
232 499 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
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rector of the Navajo Reservation to promulgate and enforce,
pursuant to federal statute, maximum price regulations governing licensed traders on the reservation. The district court had
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the federal courts have power to
order the Commissioner to enforce regulations under section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 23 3 That the Commissioner was given sole power to issue regulations did not mean
that he could simply decide not to regulate, especially in light of
the established rule that statutes passed for the benefit of the
Indians are to be construed in their favor when interpretation is
23 4
in doubt.
It thus seems well founded that if an Indian tribe can demonstrate that the Government, in its role as "guardian," has
breached its duty to the Indians by negotiating or approving a
grossly unfair lease, the tribe has redress in the federal courts.
The tribe's remedy may be in damages, or, under some circumstances, in having the lease set aside as unlawful agency action.
B.

The Scope of the United States' Duty to the
Indians in Lease Negotiations
Once the jurisdictional question is resolved, the substantive
question remains: By what standards is federal governmental
action on behalf of the Indians to be judged? The answer was
given in unequivocal terms by the United States Supreme Court
2 35
in Seminole Nation v. United States:
[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings
with these dependent and sometimes exploited people..
. . In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian
tribes, the Government is something more than a mere
contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed
policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the
acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting
2 36
fiduciay standards.
233 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
234 449 F.2d at 571;see, e.g., Squire

v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
235 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
236 Id. at 296-97 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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The obligation in question in Seminole Nation arose out of an
agreement between the tribe and the United States, as the
above-quoted language indicates. The case also dealt with treaty
obligations.
Still, the standard imposed on the Government by Seminole
Nation has been applied where the Government was acting on
behalf of the Indians and pursuant to no treaty obligation. In
Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States,23 7 for instance, the district court adopted the "exacting fiduciary standards" test of Seminole Nation in finding that the Government
had breached its duty to the band by not making certain Indian
funds productive, and by investing tribal funds in securities of
the United States bearing less interest than others which might
238
have been legally purchased with Indian funds.
The Seminole Nation test was also applied in Navajo Tribe v.
United States.239 In that case the tribe successfully claimed that
the United States had breached its duty by not turning over to
the tribe benefits of an assignment of a gas and oil lease when
the tribe's lessee assigned the lease to the United States for a
nominal consideration. The conduct of the Government was
analogized to that of a fiduciary diverting to his personal profit
an opportunity gained in the exercise of his repsonsibilities. 240
The conduct of the United States in relation to various sales
of land by the Seneca Indians in the late eigtheenth and early
nineteenth centuries was found actionable in Seneca Nation v.
United States.2 4 1 The federal government's "responsibility was not
merely to be present at the negotiations or to prevent actual
fraud, deception, or duress alone; improvidence, unfairness, the
receipt of unconscionable consideration would likewise be of
federal concern. ' 242 The court concluded: "It can be said ...
that the sales-agreement must be treated as one between the
Indians and the United States (as well as between the Indians
and the purchaser) because the Government's participation and
consent was a necessary prerequisite under the Trade and Intercourse Act. '2 43 Further principles of "fair and honorable deal237 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
238

Id. at 1243, 1245. See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 137 (Ct.
Cl. 1945); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10 (1944).
239 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. CI. 1966).
240
Id.at 324.
241 173 Ct. CI. 917 (1965).
242

Id. at 925.
Id. at 926. The Act referred to in the quotation, now codified as 25 U.S.C. § 177
(1970), forbids the sale or conveyance of any Indian lands without consent of the federal
government.
243
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ings" required the Government to account for agreements it
sanctioned in44the absence of assurances of fair consideration for
2
the Indians.
As a fiduciary the United States has an obligation to protect
the Indians not only against third parties but even against themselves, if necessary. In Oneida Tribe v. United States,2 45 the Court
of Claims held that the federal government had a duty to prevent wasteful and unlawful timber cutting by certain Oneida
Indians on their reservation. The court found, however, that the
Government had done enough to satisfy its duty.
The Supreme Court, in a recent decision, simply assumed
that the federal government had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff
tribe.2 46 The Court decided that a federal standard should govern the relationship between the tribe and the United States.
Adopting Professor Scott's well-known test, the crucial inquiry
for the Court was whether the Government had "exercise[d]
such skill and care as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property. ' 247 The Court went on to
hold that the Government had not breached its duty, but had
permissibly relied on a decision of the Supreme Court which was
unquestioned at the time it paid Oklahoma estate taxes on property held in trust for the Osage Indians.
It is apparent that the Government has taken upon itself the
panoply of burdens implicit in a strict fiduciary relationship.
Especially from the Seneca Nation case, it is evident that this relationship requires federal officials, in their supervision of Indian
leasemaking, to protect Indians against unconscionable contracts. This duty should not be negated by the Indians' participation in negotiating or approving the terms of a lease.2 48 To allow
such nominal participation to destroy the United States' duty
would defeat the entire purpose of the fiduciary relationship-to
protect those in a dependent position against those who would
take unfair advantage of them.
Because the United States thus has a duty to protect the
Indians against unconscionable leases, a tribe should be able to
recover damages from the United States upon demonstrating
the inadequacy of consideration for a granted lease. A tribe
should also be able to set aside an unconscionable agreement as
244

173 Ct. Cl. at 926.

165 Ct. CI. 487 (1964).
United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
21 Id. at 398. See 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 1408 (3d ed. 1967).
248 Cf Osage Nation v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
896 (1951); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 358-59.
245
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improper agency action which serves only to enrich the third
party lessee at the expense of the tribe.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even throughout the sometimes shameful history of mistreatment of American Indian tribes by the federal government,
the tribes have generally been recognized as retaining at least
some of the attributes of sovereignty. As "domestic dependent
nations" tribes have retained the power to tax, one of the principal attributes of a sovereign.
To the extent that state taxation of lessees of Indian lands
interferes with the tribes' sovereign rights to raise money and to
provide for the welfare of their people, the taxation should be
found invalid, unless the tax serves some limited state regulatory
purpose or is specifically authorized by Congress. In addition,
clauses in leases which purport to bind Indian tribes not to tax
their lessees should be considered void to the extent they bind
future tribal governments and prevent them from fulfilling their
sovereign governmental functions. This follows from the wellestablished doctrine that a sovereign cannot barter away inherent attributes of its sovereignty.
Even if none of the above propositions is considered correct,
an Indian tribe is owed a fiduciary duty by the United States
Government, which has forcibly assumed the role of guardian
and protector of the "domestic dependent nations" of American
Indians. This duty is enforceable in the federal courts, and unfair leases negotiated by the Government or under Government
supervision should give rise to damages actions by the Indian
tribes against the United States.

